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This paper analyzes the political and efficiency-driven determinants of supervisors’ 
(i.e., regulators and judges) appointment rules and assesses the effect of such 
institutions, considered as endogenous, on regulatory performances (i.e., prices). 
Election lowers ex ante regulated rates and it is selected by partisan planners when the 
risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and party policy differences are 
smaller. Besides, when regulators are not eager to exert costly effort in supervision tasks 
because interested in job offers from the industry (“revolving door” effect), only the 
judicial selection rule significantly affects prices. U.S. electricity market’s data confirms 
these predictions. 
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1.  Introduction 
Social “planners” must delegate actual policy choices to broadly defined “public 
decision makers” and, in doing that, they design a set of institutions able to assure 
that these agents behave coherently to their desiderata. Among such constitutional 
rules selection mechanisms cover a crucial role. Appointment and election induce 
different incentives. While politicians want to please the voters in order to win the 
elections, career concerned bureaucrats want to appear competent to politicians or 
to their appointing professional peers. However, the widely-accepted idea that 
elected  officials  choose  policies  and  appointed  ones  implement  them  finds  a 
remarkable exception in the U.S. regulatory system where regulators and High 
Court judges can be either elected or appointed. Such an environment constitutes 
a  natural  field  where  the  relation  between  judicial,  bureaucratic  and  political 
powers can be analysed along with the relative merits of different accountability 
designs. However, the existing literature has only taken into consideration the 
regulatory institutions and, Besley and Coate [2003], in the first rigorous study of 
the issue, claim that, in a perfect information  world, election allows voters to 
unbundle policy issues assuring lower regulated prices. The idea is appreciable in 
its simplicity but far from reality. Indeed, when the rough symmetric information 
hypothesis  is  relaxed,  the  consideration  of  the  hierarchical  structure  (planner-
regulator-judge-firm) through which the informational gap between planners and 
regulated firms is bridged becomes crucial in understanding the functioning of the 
agency architecture. As a careful institutional analysis reveals, a hierarchical rate 
review process emphasizes the judges’ generosity of settlement; moreover, in my   3 
theory, the judicial role becomes pivotal when judges want to leave a legacy of 
correctness (“legacy” effect) and regulators are not willing to exert costly effort 
because interested in obtaining job offers from  the industry  (“revolving door” 
effect). Election strengthens the first effect and damps the second one, moving 
policies in a more populist direction. Clearly pro-industry planners will prefer 
appointment  when  the  risk  related  to  expropriation  of  sunk  investments  is 
considerable (i.e., high cost industry and efficient signal extraction technology). 
Three are the main contributions of the paper: 1. the model finally clarifies the 
relation between regulatory outcomes and judicial appointment, which is shown 
to be the only relevant selection rule when the “revolving door” effect is strong; 2. 
from  a  positive  perspective,
1  the  paper  identifies  the  political  and  efficiency-
driven  criteria  that  have  guided partisan planners in  allocating policy  tasks  to 
elected or appointed policymakers. 3. U.S. electricity data confirm the model’s 
predictions. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies the judges’ and 
regulators’ activities within the U.S. electric power market. Section 3 illustrates 
the  model;  while  section  4  comments  on  the  econometric  results.  Section  5 
concludes delivering several remarks for constitutional designers. The appendix 
contains tables, proofs and a detailed description of the data.  
 
2. Institutions 
Investor-owned  electric  utilities  (IOUs)  account  for  over  three-fourths  of  the 
electricity sales and revenues of the U. S. electricity market. While jurisdiction 
                                                 
1 Alesina and Tabellini [2005] embrace a normative perspective. Bureaucrats perform better than 
politicians when vested interests have large stakes and ex-post voters’ preferences are predictable.   4 
over both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal 
body  (FERC),  retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions 
(PUCs), which deal with several utilities (natural gas, telecommunications, water 
and wastewater, trucking and railroad, insurance) and perform a broad range of 
tasks (e.g. they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, they avoid by-
passing by non regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth) 
among  which  the  most  important  is  the  regulation  of  prices.
2  IOUs  are  not 
allowed to receive governmental subsides and their revenue must cover their costs 
(including  managerial  rewards).  IOUs  charge  two-part  tariffs,  triggering  rate 
reviews  in  response  to  rising  costs  (Joskow  [1974]).  Even  if  dockets  can  be 
directly entrusted to a commissioner or to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
almost all the files follow a precise hierarchical trial routine composed of two 
levels  of  formal  hearings  open  to  all  the  interested  parties  (firms,  ratepayers, 
lawyers of the Attorney General’s Office). In the first instance, commissioners sit 
on  the  bench.  If  the  proposed  filing  is  not  approved,  a  formal  quasi-judicial 
hearing, presided by one or more ALJs, is opened and the quasi-judicial tribunal 
takes a qualified majority enforceable judgment.
3 During the hearings ALJs and 
commissioners examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and interpret 
precedents and regulations. The final motion to be approved is proposed by the 
PUC’s staff. Ratepayers are represented by consumer advocates, who assure that 
                                                 
2 Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado 
PUC and in the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.  
3 At this point, PUCs may review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and illegality of the 
decision  lies  on  the  firm.  Moreover,  the  former  can  appeal  to  High  Courts  on  formal  issues. 
However, these two last appeal levels are rarely granted.   5 
media  carefully  track  the  evolution  of  files.
4  The  resulting  enormous  body  of 
press testimonies reveals the critical and often underestimated relevance of ALJs’ 
activity. For instance, in 2004 an ALJ forced the Minnesota PUC to revise Qwest 
rates on the bases of anticompetitive deals; while in 2005 the Texas PUC allowed 
Cap  Rock  to  recover  most  costs  nixed  by  three  ALJs.  The  above  description 
suggests two key peculiarities of this complex agency architecture: 
1. The commissioners’ and ALJs’ role is one of supervision, i.e. they organize the 
information disclosure process but do not formulate de facto the final motion. The 
latter is put forward by the PUC’s staff that, given the complete record of the 
hearings and the participation of all the parties, is forced to consider only the 
available “hard” evidence. This is the main consequence of the adversarial nature 
of the hearings: no evidence can be denied once the precedent is individuated.  
2.  The  ALJs’  supervision  activity  evidently  allows  them  to  control  regulatory 
policies (see also Tiller [1998]). As a measure of such incidence, Table 2 reports 
the  average  number  (Dockets)  and  duration  (Doc_Dur)  of  electricity  dockets 
opened  in  the  market  over  the  1974-1990 period  (see  Table  1  for  a  complete 
description of variables names and construction). A docket typically endures nine 
months (with no significant pattern across selection regimes) and an impressing 
85.7% of these files lasted more than 5 months (i.e., the maximum length of time 
needed to set up quasi-judicial hearings):
 5 ALJs rule almost all the US electricity 
                                                 
4 Consumer advocates are state-funded bodies established in the 70s and 80s in order to allow even 
residential users to proceed before PUCs. The relative dummy is equal to 1 in the states listed in 
Holburn and Van den Bergh [2003] plus California and Michigan. This choice is not relevant. 
5 The cumulated number of days between the application reception and the quasi-judicial hearing 
date do not usually exceed 154 days (see the 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado PUC).    6 
dockets. Besides, the deep attention paid by ALJs to regulation cases would not 
strike as strange given that electricity files, with their broad echo, represent the 
most advertised among the policy positions (employment discrimination charges, 
other regulation dockets, etc.) on which judges are selected.
6  
As follows I will first formalize the above agency relations, employing as basic 
framework the Laffont and Tirole [1993]’s model, and then I will identify the 
incentives shaping the supervisors’ activities. 
 
3. Theory 
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and it charges a two part 
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive.
7 Total cost is C =θ q and 
marginal cost can take one of two values  { } , θ θ θ ∈  with probabilities v and 1 – v 
respectively.  Let  be  ( ) 0 θ θ θ ∆ = − > .  Probabilities  are  common  knowledge,  but 
only the firm’s manager knows the true value of θ.
8 Consumers have the same 
                                                 
6 To this extent, do not surprise that courts  have referred to industry’s influence to vindicate 
judicial review of PUC’s decisions (State Farm 463US29, [1983]) and that five of the eleven 
Texas politicians, who got some of Enron’s PAC last money, were ALJs (see the FTCR website). 
Finally, judges not only take authoritarian part into the pricing process, but they also overrule 
other PUCs’ policy orientations. A few years ago, the Pennsylvania PUC has rejected the decision 
of an ALJ to block the Southwestern Bell caller rates because not considered in the public interest. 
7 As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumers turns out to 
assume the some role of the governmental transfer typical of the regulation-procurement literature. 
As  a  consequence,  I  replace  the  economic  shadow  cost  of  public  funds  with  the  marginal 
deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium. 
8 Guerriero [2006, b] extends this model to the analysis of cost-reimbursement’s rules reforms.    7 
preferences; thus the demand is the one of a representative consumer with gross 
consumer surplus given by S(q). The inverse and regular demand functions and 
the firm’s revenue are given by p = P(q) = S′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A 
respectively. Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A 
is optimally fixed so as to make them indifferent between buying or not the good 
i.e., A ≡ S(q) – P(q)q. As underlined in section 2, firm’s revenues must cover 
managerial  reward  t;  this  implies  that:  A  +  pq(p)  ≥  t.  Both  the  firm  and  the 
supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. The firm’s utility is given by 
U = t –θ q ≥ 0 and a reservation level of 0 is required. Let me denote the social 
surplus obtained producing q as V(q) with V(0) = 0, V′ > 0 and V′′< 0. V(q) is the 
sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s revenue evaluated at the shadow 
price of managerial reward λ and it rewrites as: 
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).                                   
The planner’s objective function, labelled with subscript P, is: 
P W  = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) (A + pq(p) – t) + U =  
       = V(q) – (1+λ)C – λU   =  V(q) – (1+λ)θ q – λU.                                         (1)        
Here, 1 + λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint; 
note that, in contrast with the program where governmental transfers are allowed, 
λ depends on both c and t. Under complete information, the planner implements 
the first best allocation through a simple cost target contract leaving no rent to the 
firm. Instead, under asymmetric information, she does not observe the realization 
of  θ   and  maximizes  expected  social  welfare  offering  a  pair  of  incentive 
compatible schemes (q ,t ), (q,t). The low cost firm enjoys an informational rent 
while the high cost one receives a distorted allocation (see Laffont and Tirole   8 
[1993]  for  details).  Now  suppose  that  the  planner  can  relax  the  informational 
asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of two supervisors (i.e. a regulator and a 
judge) designed to match the institutions described in section 2. These supervisors 
can, exerting costly effort, tailor the supervision activity to the specific docket 
(i.e., they choose the number and quality of the experts, the firms’ official papers 
to be examined and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and the supervisors’ 
random ability (e.g., ability to examine witnesses and to understand precedents 
and prevailing regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As 
emphasized in section 2, the report is effectively delivered by the PUC’s staff, so 
I  simply  assume  that  the  planner  has  directly  at  her  disposal  this  benevolent 
information tool.
9 Moreover, given that in the U.S. electricity market PUCs’ rules 
and conducts prohibit communication between  supervisors, no side contract is 
allowed between these players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up, 
the planner receives a signal σ = {θ; φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ 
determined by the supervisors’ activity. The information is hard in the sense that 
it is verifiable and every interested party can convince himself that the signal 
corresponds to the true state of the world. The signal can only inform about θ.  If 
θ =  θ with probability ξ the planner sees σ =  θ and implements the complete 
information contract and with probability 1 – ξ she observes σ =φ . If θ = θ , then 
σ =φ  always.
10 When σ =  φ , the planner is uninformed, and she updates her 
beliefs  applying  Bayes  rule.  Supervisors  are  evaluated  according  to  the 
                                                 
9 Besides the constraints imposed by the adversarial trial structure, explicit incentives can be 
designed for staff’s members, who are not implicitly motivated by any appointment rule. 
10 This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide 
verifiable information only when the proof is possible: low cost case (see also Laffont [2000]).   9 
performance ξ  ∈ [0, 1], which is described by the docket’s records and has a 
technology given by ξ = αe + e. Each supervisor first exerts effort and then she 
learns her ability. Effort e takes value on (0,  u ξ /2] with  ( ) 0,1
u ξ ∈ . The effort’s 
cost function writes as  ( ) ( )(1 ) C C K = − ￿ i i
￿
 where  ) 0, K K  ∈  measures the efficiency 
of  the  signal  extraction  technology;  K  is  increasing  in  the  amount  of  PUC’s 
resources  and  in  the  watchdog  groups’  ability  to  provide  hard  information. 




= ∞ ￿ . Thus, the full precision 
case is ruled out and it is not possible to obtain a precision of  u ξ  through effort 
only. The random ability α has support (0, 1). Without no loss of generality,
11 
suppose that α ~ Beta (g, b) with density  fy(y; g, b) = [y
g–1(1 – y)




g b y y dy
− − − ∫  (the Beta function). The mean is α  = g/(g + b). If g = b 
= 1, I obtain a uniform distribution on (0, 1): from a Bayesian point of view, this 
is the case of uninformative prior on the supervisors’ ability. The mild restrictions 
I impose on g and b are such that the distribution of α is symmetric (g = b), which 
can be relaxed and hump-shaped (informative), i.e. g > 1 and b > 1. Here α and e 
assume  the  meaning  of  overall  measures:  they  take  into  account  the  different 
judges’ and regulators’ abilities. For sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of 
equal draw of α. If either e or ξ are verifiable or contractible, a simple “selling the 
store” contract reaches efficiency. However, the assumption that the planner can 
write unrestricted contingent contracts with the supervisors does not fit in any 
way reality and so I assume that ξ is always observable but not contractible.  
                                                 
11 Indeed, all the theoretical results continue to hold if one of the other continuous non degenerate 
distributions  supported  on  a  bounded  interval  (i.e.:  Triangular,  Kumaraswamy,  Logarithmic,   10 
The timing of the game is given as follows: 
1. Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3. and 4. 
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that { } , θ θ θ ∈ . 
Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: θ. 
2.  The  planner  offers  a  menu  of  managerial  reward-quantity  pairs  to  the  firm 
contingent to the realization of the eventual signals obtained through the hearing 
process. Moreover, an exogenously given wage s, set at the reservation level  ˆ s 
(for sake of simplicity assumed equal for both), is given to the two supervisors.
12 
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; next she discovers her random ability 
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best 
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge is asked to rule it.  
4. Step 3. is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks 
to the firm to report its marginal cost (asymmetric information regime).  
5. Last a reward-quantity pair is implemented and evaluators make their move.
13 
Supervisors face different incentives as a function of the nature of the task and of 
the selection rule. The two dimensions of heterogeneity (regulators vs. judges and 
appointed vs. elected) are captured by the indexes i = {Appointed, Elected} and l 
                                                                                                                                     
Uniform) is employed (see also footnote 13). Among these, the Beta function is the most versatile. 
12 Laffont and Martimort [1999] suppose full contracting on the supervisors’ performance. The 
resulting equilibria are collusion-proof, i.e. costly rewards are paid to non-benevolent supervisors 
and the high cost type allocation is distorted even more in order to lower the firm stake. This set 
up is neither realistic nor able to capture the supervisors’ implicit incentives. 
13 Elected supervisors are evaluated by a rational electorate (this is true for judges as well and, 
indeed, “the curse of the elective system is that it turns every elective judge into a politician,” 
ABA, 1981). Appointed supervisors are evaluated by politicians or by a selection committee.   11 
 = {Regulator, Judge}. The supervisors’ utility function is given by:  
{ } , , , , ˆ ( , ) 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 (1 ) ) ( )
i
i l i l i l i l R e S SR G e S J C e s τ   = + − − − −  
￿ .                                     (2) 
In (2), S is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge and the parameter τ 
measures the strength of the career concerns.  ( ) ,
i
i l G e  differentiates bureaucrats 
and politicians (here my reference is the Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]’s model). 
Politicians want to be re-elected and this happens if  , E l ξ  exceeds a threshold  , E l ξ . 
This amounts to say that  ( ) { } , , , Pr
E
E l E l E l G e ξ ξ = ≥ . Voters are rational in the sense 
that they understand that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician with 
average talent who will achieve a precision 
exp
, , (3/2) E l E l e ξ =  (where the apex exp 
refers  to  the  voters’  expectation).  Therefore,  it  follows  that:  ( ) { , Pr
E
E l G e α = ≥  
( ) }
exp
, , 3 /2 1 E l E l e e   ≥ −   .  Instead,  bureaucrats  are  career  concerned  and  they  want  to 
maximize the conditional perception of their ability. Employing E(·) (or, with a 
slight abuse of notation, the apex exp) to indicate the evaluator’s expectation over 
α given the performance realization and E to label the unconditional expectation 
over  , A l ξ , it follows that: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
exp exp
, , , , , E 1 /
A
A l A l A l A l A l G e E E e e e α ξ α   = = + −   . Now, 
a  glance  at  ( )
E G i   and ( )
A G i   reveals  how  elected  supervisors  will  exert  more 
effort than appointed ones.
14 Finally in (2) R and J represent regulators and judges 
                                                 
14 In fact, the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for all g and b 
greater than 1. The relevant inequality (i.e., fα(α ) > 1) remains true for g ≠ b (asymmetric Beta) 
and for all the other continuous distributions supported on a bounded interval (except for the 
uninformative prior/uniform case when it holds as equality) when the hump-shape property is 
imposed. Proofs are available upon request. The result becomes local for imperfect substitutability 
between e and α (ξ = (α + Z)e). Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα(α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].   12 
specific parameters. They are defined on (0, 1). R captures the “revolving-door” 
effect:  regulators  are  attracted  by  future  job  opportunities  in  the  regulated 
industry. The higher is R the less willing will be a regulator to exert effort in order 
to favour her future principals. J formalizes the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of 
correctness and fairness (“legacy effect”). The higher is J the lower will be the 
cost for a judge to put effort into a proceeding in order to uncover the true (see 
also  Levy  [2005]).
15  The  solution  to  the  supervisors’  optimum  problems  (see 
Appendix 6.1) implies the following equilibrium efforts’ rankings:  , , ˆ ˆ E J A J e e >  and 
, , ˆ ˆ E R A R e e > . Judges and politicians exert more effort than regulators and bureaucrats 
respectively. Besides, note that: 1.  , ˆA J e  is greater than  , ˆE R e  if  (1 – R)(1 – J) fα(α ) 
<  1;  2.  a  more  efficient  supervision  technology  (higher  K)  increases  all  the 
equilibrium levels of effort; 3. other accountability institutions affect the implicit 
incentives’  power  and,  in  particular,  a  longer  length  term  would  relax  the 
“revolving door” effect creating focus on the signal extraction task. At stage 2. the 
planner foresees the supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of contracts 
contingent on the eventual signals {σR, σJ} and characterized by the above levels 
of effort. Here, there is no strategic interaction between the supervisors’ effort 
choice and the planner’s mechanism design program: this nicely reveals division 
of powers’ properties of the model. The planner’s posterior belief on θ = θ is: 
, , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 { [ ( )] (1 [ ( )]) [ ( )]}) (1 ( , ))
Pr( / , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 { [ ( )] (1 [ ( )]) [ ( )]} 1 ( , )
i R i R i R i R i J i J i R i J
R J
i R i R i R i R i J i J i R i J
v E e E e E e v e e
v E e E e E e v e e
ξ ξ ξ γ
θ θ σ φ σ φ
ξ ξ ξ γ
− + − −
= = = = =
− + − −
. 
Define µ as the shadow cost of public funds. In the supervision regime (apex S) 
the planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as: 
                                                 
15 The revolving door effect does not seem to exist for ALJs.   13 
* , , ,
, , , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ (1 ( , )) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( , ) [1 ( , )] ( ) (1 )
ˆ ˆ 1 ( , )
i R i J AI S S S S
P i R i J i R i J
i R i J
v e e
W v e e W v e e V q q q
v e e
γ
γ γ λ θ λ θ
γ
 −    = + − − + − ∆ +    −  
      
                                 
, ,
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) 2(1 )
ˆ ˆ 1 ( , )
S S
i R i J
v




 −    + − + − +    −  
.                       (3) 
As usual, the inefficiency introduced by the asymmetry in information is entirely 
absorbed by the distortion in the low (high cost) type’s quantity. Thus, differences 
in the ex ante regulated prices are entirely determined by the low type equilibrium 
allocation  ˆ S q , which is pinned down by the following condition:  
, , ˆ ˆ (1 ( , )) ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
1
i R i J S S v e e
V q S q
v
λ γ
λ λ θ θ
−
′ ′ = + = + + ∆
−
.                                    (4) 
In order to lower the high type rent, the planner is forced to distort the low type’s 
allocation  away  from  the  first  best;  however,  in  (4)  higher  values  of  K  and 
supervisors’ election increase  , , ˆ ˆ ( , ) i R i J e e γ . Thus, more efficient signal extraction 
technologies and the election rule curb such a distortion and a nice substitutability 
between explicit market incentives to the regulated firm and the design of the 
hierarchical institutions arises. Proposition 1 summarizes: 
Proposition 1: Elected supervisors and a more efficient supervision technology 
lower ex-ante equilibrium prices. 
Similarly, the desire to leave a legacy of fairness (high J) and a mild exposure to 
“revolving door” promises (small R) increase the precision of the planner’s signal 
(i.e., the value of  , , ˆ ˆ ( , ) i R i J e e γ ). Such a remark suggests that there is an high enough 
value of R (say  R ) such that almost all the dockets approach the quasi-judicial 
hearing stage because regulators select a very small level of effort; symmetrically 
does exist an high enough value of J (sayJ ) such that the eventual second signal 
received by the planner (σJ) has a very high precision. Thus for values of R and J   14 
higher than  R  and  J respectively, the marginal effect of the regulators’ selection 
rule becomes almost insignificant in explaining prices: this is confirmed by the 
model’s calibration (tables available upon request). When I impose a quadratic 
cost function the order  , , , , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ E J A J E R A R e e e e > > >  is upset only for very low values of R 
and J, generally (it depends on the values of g and h) smaller than 0.25, and the 
judge’s marginal effect is significantly bigger than the regulator’s one for high 
enough values of R and J.
16 Clearly enough, these features remain true when I 
endow appointed regulators with bigger R. This variation captures the Besley and 
Coate [2003]’s bundling effect: governor interested in the industry support select 
pro-shareholders regulators. The following proposition summarizes: 
Proposition 2: For high enough values of R or J, only the judges’ selection rule 
significantly affect ex ante regulated prices. 
At this point, it is instructive to stress that the picture drawn until now is partially 
shaded.  I  assumed  a  myopic  and  public  interested  planner,  but  what  happens 
when partisan interests and concern for firm’s investments appear on the scene? 
 
3.1 Endogenous Appointment Rules 
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and 
investments arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to 
a  contract  contingent  on  the  level  of  investments,  equilibrium  allocations  can 
                                                 
16 The pure elective supervisors’ marginal effects ratio 
, , , , , , ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] E R E R E J E J E R E R E e E e E e ξ ξ ξ     − =       
is generally about 4 for low values (i.e.: 0.2) of both R and J  and quickly rises to 7-10 for enough 
strong implicit incentives (R or J over 0.5, or both over 0.4). R is the more effective among the 
two parameters in pushing π up, i.e. there is a first mover prevalence of the regulator’s activity.   15 
envision ex post expropriation of sunk investments. In this sense, non-benevolent 
supervisors may relax such a time inconsistency. The intuition proposes several 
crucial questions: is it possible to think of the supervisors’ effort exertion as a 
pandering activity when investments decisions are taken into consideration? How 
much partisan planners care about such decisions when they select appointment 
rules? How much is this choice driven by efficiency evaluations and how strong 
are the rent seeking forces? A first set of answers arise naturally when the above 
model is bridged to the parallel analysis in Laffont and Tirole [1993]. Let me 
assume  that,  before  stage  1.,  the  regulated  firm  fixes  the  level  of  a  non 
contractible investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I) the probability that a high 
type  is  drawn.  Let  me  assume  that 
1( )
( ) 0, ( ) 0, lim , (1 )/
I v




′ ′′ > < = ∞ = − i i   and 
that investments are sufficiently effective, i.e.  ( ) 1 ( ) v ζ θ ′ > ∆ i . The planner lacks 
commitment but anticipates the optimal I (i.e., I
*). Ex ante the firm maximizes its 
expected ex post rent minus investment costs: 
{ }
* , *
0 , , ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( )
S I
I i R i J I v I e e q I I ζ γ θ ≥ ∈ + − ∆ − .                                           (5) 
The firm underinvests with respect to the social optimum (see Appendix 6.2 for a 
revealed  preference  argument)  and  a  glance  to  (5)  suggests  that  the  extent  of 
inefficiency is higher the more precise the planner’s signal is. So the supervisors’ 
information  extraction  activity  can  assume  a  pandering  feature  when  effort  is 
driven  more  by  career  concerns  than  by  a  farsighted  interest  in  the  market’s 
efficiency and a planner caring about cost-reducing investments, because faced 
with a high cost market, will prefer appointment. Proposition 3 summarizes: 
Proposition 3: An investment-concerned planner prefers supervisors’ election if 
faced with a low cost industry or a less efficient supervision technology.   16 
This  inefficiency  is  even  stronger  when  investments  are  directed  towards 
reliability and quality services. In fact, these activities do not lower the firm’s cost 
but increase its long run profits: evidently also a conflict between consumers’ 
groups  arises  here.  To  capture  this,  I  assume  that the  constitutional  reform  is 
decided  by  the  incumbent  among  two  parties:  one  more  pro-shareholders  R 
(Republican) and one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1. 
and 2., each party faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]).  The 
winner decides the size of an instrument (ρj) increasing the investment’s utility for 
the  firm  ( ˆ ( , ) j G I ρ ).  A  type  j  planner  attaches  weights J χ ￿ and  χj  to  ( ) G i   and  I 
respectively. The weights are such that: 1 2 , 1 , 2 1, 1 R D R D d d d d χ χ χ χ = + = + = − = − ￿ ￿  
and  d λ > represents the extent of party policy differences. Thus, a Republican 
planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in the firm’s rent. The firm is 
risk averse towards non cost-reducing investments and the following regularities 
hold:  1 11 2 0, 0, 0, G G G > < >   22 12 21 0, 0, 0 G G G < > > .  
Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to 
maximize its expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint: 
{ }
* ,
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ argmax ( , ) . .:
S I
I j I G I t q st A pq t I ρ θ ≥ + − + ≥ + .                                                  (6) 
I
* is a function of the selection rules and of both d and of the optimal ρj, which is 
such that: ˆ ˆ R D ρ ρ > . Let me define
* , ˆ ˆ ( ( ), ) ( , )
S I
j I q i I i j ρ ≡ . It follows that  ( , ) I A R ≥ 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) I E R I A D I E D ≥ ≥ ≥ . Let me focus on regimes in which supervisors share 
the same selection rule and define:  
                      , , ˆ ˆ ( ) 1 ( , ) i R i J i e e γ γ ≡ − ;                 ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j I i j I i j x I i j I i j ≡ − + − − ￿    ; 
           ˆ ( ( , ), ) ( , ) j G I i j G i j ρ ≡           ;                    ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) j G i j G i j x G i j G i j ≡ − + − − ￿ . 
On top of it, a type j planner’s ex post expected welfare function writes as:   17 
( )
, , , ( , ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( , ) ( 1 ) ( , ) 1 ( , )
AI S I AI S
j P j j W i j W i v i G i j I i j G i j I γ λ χ χ λ ο   = + + + + − − − −∂ ∂  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
where ο is the shadow price of the moral hazard in investment constraint (first 
order condition of (6)). The planner considers the political uncertainty and selects 
appointment  the  greater  is  the  likelihood  of  expropriation.  Such  a  strategic 
institutional  design  explanation  extends  to  the  regulators’  appointment  rules’ 
reform the intuition suggested by Hanssen [2004 b] for the ALJs’ selection rule 
(i.e., the election of ALJs is linked to a stronger incumbent grip on power and to a 
smaller party policy distance).
17 The constitutional design is affected by xj and d 
and partisan planners design regulatory institutions in a dynamically inefficient 
manner  if  enough  interested  in  assuring  high  rents  to  the  regulated  firm. 
Proposition 4 reports the precise patterns (see Appendix 6.3 for proofs): 
Proposition 4: A. Republican incumbent reformers prefer elected regulators to 
appointed  ones. B.  The  likelihood  of  a  reform  towards  regulators’  election  is 
higher the smaller the party policy differences are and the weaker (stronger) the 
incumbent party’s grip on power is if she is Republican (Democratic).  
As main result the above section has identified the political and efficiency-driven 
forces that have guided partisan planners in allocating policy tasks to elected and 
appointed supervisors. However, when positive rents remain in equilibrium and 
new resources  are in the hands of the regulated firm, the fear of supervisors’ 
capture  constitutes  a  last  crucial  issue  to  be  discussed:  section  3.2  closes  the 
theory proposing a few remarks about the impact on the model of the action of an 
organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s rent. 
                                                 
17 Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to 
implement institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on 
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).   18 
3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing 
Both ALJs and PUCs’ commissioners exert effort in other tasks. As seen above, 
examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated utilities and the analysis 
of environmental regulation. The organized group want to relax the supervision 
constraint offering side-contracts conditional on this second effort level supposed 
(as in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a]) observable and contractible.
18 The interest 
group has all the bargaining power and influences supervisors, one at the time, 
either  directly  (bribes)  or  indirectly  (campaign  contributions)  just  before  the 
supervision effort is decided in stages 3. or in 4.. Let me assume that the level of 
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm 
but implies a relevant cost (in terms of effort) to the supervisor (i.e., the effort 
cost function  ( ) , ,
h
i l i l C e e +  is non-divisible). It turns out that in a jointly optimal 
equilibrium  , ˆ 0 i l e =  so that the high type’s firm enjoys a higher informational rent 
(proofs  are  available  upon  request).  Even  if  discouraging,  these  equilibria  are 
fragile and the following remarks apply: 1. Judges are less corruptible even if the 
return to bribe them is higher (they exert a higher level of effort); 2. Bribes do not 
arise if the punishment that a supervisor receives if caught is high enough; 3. 
Campaign  contributions,  although  legal,  would  be  not  even  affordable  for  the 
interest  group,  which  has  to  reimburse  supervisors  for  the  entire  amount  of 
implicit incentives (this is due to the multiplicative technology for the precision). 
Thus, provided that implicit incentives are strong enough (i.e., high enough τ, R 
and J in (2)) the model remains robust to the introduction of lobbying and bribing. 
                                                 
18 Here I take aside the eventual multiple principals-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost 
minimization across supervisors’ side payments.  This remains as open agenda for future research.   19 
It is clear how, at this point, the other main contribution of the paper is to face the 
above model with the U.S. electric power market’s data. 
 
4.  Evidence: Elected vs. Appointed Supervisors 
The empirical analysis of the paper refers to two main bodies of literature: elected 
vs. appointed regulators and elected vs. appointed judges. While a first colourful 
block
19 of empirical analysis reported mixed and not conclusive evidence, recent 
literature has claimed that elected regulators tend to be more populist in their 
policy making.
20 Interesting is the cross firms approach chosen by Kwoka [2002] 
who, employing data on IOUs and POUs (Public Owned Utilities) for the 1996, 
shows  that  accountability-enhancing  institutions  (elected  commissioners,  PUCs 
with fewer members and public ownership) are linked to lower electricity prices. 
The main drawback of this cross states tradition is that time periods and controls 
differ widely among studies and Besley and Coate [2003] have considered this 
literature  “worrisome  for  convincing  empirical  testing.”  In  order  to  solve  the 
issue, recent works have considered also the time dimension. Looking at the long-
run mean electricity prices for residential, commercial and industrial users for a 
panel of 44 states, Besley and Coate [2003] find that elected regulators set lower 
                                                 
19  Some  of  these  contributions  looked  at  rate  setting  while  others  have  chosen,  as  regulatory 
performances, broad measures of the regulatory climate. Examples are: Berry [1979], Harris and 
Navarro  [1983],  Smiley  and  Green  [1983],  Costello  [1984],  Crain  and  McCormick  [1984], 
Primeaux and Mann [1986] and Atkinson and Nowell [1994]. 
20 Falaschetti [2005] reports results that suggest how providers of local exchange services maintain 
significantly smaller capital stocks in electing states. Other interesting contributions are: Smart 
[1994], Mishra and Thistle [1995] and Fields, Klein and Sfiridis [1997].   20 
residential  rates  and  are  less  likely  to  pass  through  cost  changes  into  prices. 
Employing a panel of electric utilities’ rate reviews, Holburn and Spiller [2002] 
show that elected PUCs are linked to lower residential-industrial rate ratios and 
lower returns on equity. A smaller amount of empirical work has dealt with the 
differences among appointed and elected judges.
21 Helland and Tabarrok [1999, 
2000] find evidence that partisan elected judges redistribute wealth from out-of-
state business to in-state plaintiffs, who are typically voters. Besley and Payne 
[2003]  study  a  panel  of  U.S.  States  and  report  results  according  to  which 
appointing states see fewer charges for race, age and gender discrimination being 
brought. Two are the contributions of the empirical part of the paper: 1. evaluate 
the relative explaining power of the political and efficiency-driven determinants 
of appointment rules; 2. bridge the different empirical traditions paying, at last, 
attention  to  the  relation  linking  the  judges’  appointment  rule  and  regulatory 
performances. As a consequence, two are also the sets of empirical predictions:  
Empirical  Predictions:  1.  A.  Supervisors’  election  is  linked  to  less  effective 
supervision technologies and to low cost industries; B. Regulators’ election is 
more likely if the reformer is Democratic, the smaller party policy differences are 
and  the  lower  (higher)  the  incumbent  grip  on  power  is  if  she  is  Republican 
(Democratic). Judges’ election is more likely the stronger the grip on power is 
and the smaller party policy differences are. 2. A. Supervisors’ election and an 
efficient supervision technology lower ex-ante equilibrium prices; B. Regulators’ 
election would likely be not (statistically) significant in explaining prices. 
                                                 
21 Lateral evidence (see Hanssen [1999, 2000]) highlights how appointed courts are associated 
with a higher degree of decision uncertainty (i.e., higher number of PUCs’ disputes, of High Court 
filings and higher number of employees in regulatory, insurance and education bureaucracies).   21 
I take advantage of my forerunners; so I first present cross firms results for the 
1996 (as in Kwoka [2002] this would avoid the small sample pitfalls of a cross 
states analysis), warning the reader that this strategy can lead to fragile inference 
in presence of “non-random pattern of constitutional reforms and the extensive 
differences  among  [individuals]  belonging  to  different  constitutional  groups” 
(Persson and Tabellini [2003]). Then, as final robustness checks, panel estimates 
in all similar to the one reported in Besley and Coate [2003] are commented. First 
of all, point 1. of the Empirical Predictions is evaluated.  
 
4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection 
Institutions are defined as follows. The elected judges’ dummy (Jud_Elec) takes 
value 1 if ALJs are selected through both partisan or non-partisan election and 0 
otherwise  (e.g.:  appointment  by  state  legislature,  gubernatorial  and  merit  plan 
appointment). As Table 3 shows, 13 states have changed their judges’ selection 
rule during the sample 1970-1997; among these, eight switched from election to 
appointment (or vice versa).
22 The elected regulators’ dummy (Reg_Elec) takes 
value 1 if PUCs’ commissioners are in whatever way elected, 0 otherwise;
23 six 
                                                 
22 Non-partisan election forbids candidates to reveal party affiliation, but most researchers agree 
that the two institutions are alike (see Atkins and Glick [1974]). Some state imposes retention 
election to judges (merit plan). Besley and Payne [2003] claim that these states would constitute a 
third group in which retention produces an extra accountability incentive; but Hall and Aspin 
[1987] show how sitting judges almost never loose these elections. Besides it is widely accepted 
that merit plan, that forbids campaign contributions by law, produces the most independent judges. 
23 There are seven regulatory selection rules (see Besley and Coate [2003]). South Carolina and 
Tennessee both switched in 1996. I considered both states as electing given that the previously   22 
are the switching states (see Table 3). These two dummies are lowly correlated (– 
0.006); so I can control prices for both of them at the same time without fear for 
multicollinearity. To capture the party policy differences and the efficiency of the 
production and signal extraction technologies, I need reasonable proxies. Party 
policy differences are measured by the absolute difference in the percentage of 
seats held by Democrats and Republicans (Av_Dist); while the average percentage 
of seats held by the majority party (Av_Maj) is the proxy capturing the incumbent 
holding on power (see Hanssen [2004, b]). Two long run means (Av_Maj.1996 
and Av_Dist.1996) are introduced as controls in the cross-sectional index models 
where the incumbent holding on power’s hypothesis cannot be tested. Besides, in 
the Reg_Elec index model the effect of a Republican incumbent party (Rep) is 
introduced both directly and indirectly. Creating a proxy for the efficiency of the 
supervision technology is a more complex task. My strategy is to use the two sets 
of observables that more likely enhance the likelihood of information extraction: 
proxies for the power of watchdog groups and measures of the amount of staff’s 
resources.  The  first  group  includes: Ind  (proportion  of  revenues  form  sales  to 
industrial users), Advocate (state consumer advocate office’s dummy), Over_65 
(proportion  of  population  aged  over  65),  Young  (proportion  aged  5-17).  The 
second set is composed by Budget (PUC’s staff budget) and Employ (the number 
of permanent staff’s members). The latter, unfortunately, is a very crude measure 
for efficiency. Varied and unobservable (in my data) skills are required to the 
PUC’s members so it is not clear if higher values of Employ assure a more precise 
signal or instead relax the staff’s benevolence. Investments’ concerns are likely 
                                                                                                                                     
elected commissioners were confirmed. No one of the results is affected when I consider the two 
states as appointing or I employ  slightly different definitions for Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec.   23 
linked to costly generation (P_Fuel, cst and O&M) and to the imputed cost of net 
electric utility plant (Plant). Because public officials’ accountability depends not 
only on the selection rules but also on how often evaluators can fire them, I add as 
covariate the length of the judicial term, Jud_Term (the regulators’ one is never 
significant). Finally, other controls are: dockets’ duration Doc_Dur (a proxy for 
state specific litigation features), generation by fossil fuels sources (Gen_Fuel), 
state population (Pop), income (Income) and education (Edu) and year in which 
the state has joined the union (Join). Table 4 reports the results of both a Logit 
model run on a cross section of 144 firms for the 1996 and a random effect panel 
Logit run on a panel of 49 states over the 1970-1997 sample. Controls excluded in 
one specification and other covariates employed in the pricing equations were 
highly not significant. The evidence strongly supports the model’s predictions.
24 
For what concern the holding on power proxies, the results clearly lean towards 
the strategic use explanation: smaller party policy differences favour supervisors’ 
election and Republican incumbents tend to prefer appointed regulators. A bit 
more mixed is the evidence on the efficiency of the signal extraction technology: 
when significant, the coefficients attached to the proxies present the correct signs, 
all except the one attached to Employ, Budget, Over_65 and Ind. While the first 
sign comes at no surprise given the above remark, an appealing explanation for 
                                                 
24 Hanssen [2004 b] reports similar evidence on the strategic use effect for the judges’ selection 
rule while Falaschetti [2005] and Holburn and Vanden Bergh [2003] show some similar results for 
the regulators’ selection rule. In order to check part 1.B of the Empirical Predictions, remember 
that the impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is simply given by the sum of the coefficient 
on Rep plus the coefficient on Av_Maj*Rep multiplied for the mean of Av_Maj, i.e.: – 6.413 = 
39.449 – 68.553*0.669. Similar calculations imply that the Democratic marginal effect is: – 0.731.   24 
the last three is that, in a dynamic set up, the friction between supervisors and 
interested parties would become so sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal. 
Finally, high marginal costs increase the attractiveness of appointed supervisors. 
The main empirical patterns remain true when states’ level data are employed. 
Next I will analyze the relation between selection rules and regulated prices.  
 
4.2  Pricing Models 
Table 2 reports the differences in non-controlled long run prices’ means between 
states that elect and appoint their ALJs. The latter states enjoyed significantly (at 
1%)  lower  rates  for  all  customer  classes  (1970-97).
25  This  finding  is  only 
suggestive, but, as I will show, it is robust to a series of multivariate analysis tests. 
I employ two basic models to estimate the “constitutional” treatment effect: a cost 
of service (COS) cross firms pricing model and a panel pass-trough model based 
on states’ level data.
26 Under COS, IOUs set prices at system-wide average costs, 
which are: operations and maintenance (O&M) and depreciation and amortization 
(D&A) payments, taxes (Taxes) and capital charges (Plant). All these figures are 
                                                 
25 If I look to the PUCs’ breakdown, only the residential users’ difference is significant (at 10%). 
26 OLS estimates present robust standard errors. Joskow, Rose and Shepard [1993] and Kwoka 
[2002], who is my reference in this subsection, employ similar pricing models. States that elect 
their judges have historically offered “public benefit programs”. When I introduce binaries for 
low-income assistance and funded demand side management programs, renewable promotion and 
R&D initiatives into the pricing model no result is altered. The same holds true for input costs, 
dual product monopoly and incentive based regulation dummies, sales, market conducts and the 
other controls present in selection rules’ index models. The latter and the fact that neither Docket 
nor  Doc_Dur  pass  the  endogeneity  test  would  reassure  the  reader  about  the  Leaver  [2003]’s 
results: commissioners’ length term has a negative effect on prices and a positive one on Docket.   25 
expressed  in  cents  per  Kwh.  As  (4)  suggests,  along  with  election  an  efficient 
signal extraction technology lowers regulated prices. Instead, accountability rules 
relaxing implicit incentives (Jud_Term) would increase them. I expect Employ, 
Budget,  Ind,  Over_65  and  Advocate  to  be  positively  related  to  more  efficient 
signal extraction technologies; 3Mem_Com (3 members’ PUC) would show an 
opposite pattern. Finally, Doc_Dur - a proxy of a sour filing bargaining - would 
have a positive marginal effect. Gen_Fuel and Join control for differences in the 
generation  structures  and  overall  quality  of  institutions,  respectively.  Table  5 
reports least squares estimates of the above pricing model. O&M, D&A, Taxes 
and  Plant  (not  reported)  present  the  correct  sign  and  are  statistically  highly 
significant (most of the time at 1%). The magnitudes of the coefficients (except 
the one of Plant) are near unit: these expenses are passed through dollar per dollar 
to prices. The coefficients attached to Plant imply a 5% rate base. The evidence 
on the signal extraction technology is mixed: an explanation similar to the one 
given above applies here. Focusing on selection rules, Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec 
assume,  almost  all  the  time,  the  correct  negative  signs  but  they  are  never 
significant:  could  violations  of  the  conditional  independence  assumption  be 
responsible for such a pattern? As shown in section 3.1, appointment rules are not 
randomly assigned to states. Now, if the variation in constitutional rules used to 
explain prices is related to the random (unexplained) determinants of the pricing 
process, OLS inference becomes biased. Indeed, states may well self select into 
election  on  the  basis  of  legal,  political  and  social  treats  fostering  the  planner 
concerns  with  investments’  expropriation,  as  well  as  a  basic  strain  in  legally 
favouring or making acceptable to consumers the need for technology progress. In 
order to address this classical selection bias failure, I first decide what selection   26 
rule has to be correctly treated as exogenous. To this extent, Table 5 reports the p-
values of the Davidson and MacKinnon test:
27 cross firms’ data advice to treat 
only Jud_Elec as endogenous. Besides, it is worth to stress that Reg_Elec is never 
significant when treated as endogenous and that the results do not change when 
both  dummies  are  contemporaneously  treated  as  endogenous  or  interaction-
dummies (for example Reg_Elec*Jud_Elec) are added. The latter (whether or not 
considered as endogenous) are always statistically not significant. This assures 
that  looking  at  the  impact  of  supervisors’  election  separately  is  the  correct 
strategy and not an unreasonable restriction on the data. I deal with selection bias 
both  employing  instrumental  variables  and  the  LIML  to  isolate  the  truly 
exogenous variation in the rules and directly adjusting OLS for “self-selection”. 
 
4.2.1 Instrumental Variables, Heckman and LIML Estimates 
The first stage of the 2SLS estimator is specified exactly as in section 4.2 and the 
set of exogenous or excluded instruments (i.e. the controls that are significant in 
the index models but not in the pricing equations) is given by: Av_Maj, Av_Dist, 
Edu. These three variables have all the characteristics of good instruments: as 
seen above, they are highly significant in explaining Jud_Elec and clearly enough 
they are exogenous to the pricing process. Moreover, there are not small sample 
problems here and the only reasonable objection to this specification strategy is 
the possible weakness of the employed instruments. When the latter is not an 
                                                 
27 The Davidson and MacKinnon test consists of a two-step procedure. First, selection rules are 
regressed on all the index and pricing models controls. Then the retrieved residuals are introduced 
in  the  OLS  specification  reported  in  Table  5:  if  the  OLS  estimates  are  consistent,  then  the 
coefficient on the first stage residuals should not be significant in the second step.    27 
issue  the  F-test  on  the excluded  instruments  has  to  be  at  least  10  (see  Stock, 
Wright and Yogo [2002]). As Table 4 shows, this figure for the Jud_Elec index 
model is around 21. Such an observation along with the fact that the data never 
reject  the  over-identifying  restrictions,  and  that  the  results  are  robust  to  the 
consideration  of  sub-sets  of  the  excluded  instruments  reassures  about  the 
consistency  of  the  estimates.  Columns  (1)  through  (4)  of  Table  6  report  the 
coefficients attached to Jud_Elec and Reg_Elec when the first one is treated as 
endogenous.  Reg_Elec  is,  again,  almost  always  negative  but  never  significant 
while Jud_Elec shows a negative marginal effect, significantly different from zero 
for average and industrial rates (at 5%).
28 Industrial users secure 1.130 cents per 
Kwh, which is a considerable 21% reduction (the one for the average price is 
about 16%). The evidence becomes sharp looking at Table 7: here LIML and 
Heckman estimates of the average and industrial pricing equations are reported. 
The  relevant  coefficients  and  standard  errors  remain  almost  unchanged  and 
Jud_Elec is significant at 5% in the Heckman estimates. Here, the correlation 
between the residuals in the pricing and selection equations (rho) is positive (0.85 
in (3) and 0.86 in (4)) and very precisely estimated: OLS tend to overestimate the 
constitutional effect.
29 So, when recursivity is relaxed, judges’ election implies a 
                                                 
28 Dockets’ filings interest the whole rate structure, so residential-voters would not be advantaged 
over other users. Indeed, panel results show that the effect is significant for all customer classes. 
29 Imposing linearity I have ruled out any interaction effect between institutions and controls. If 
incorrect, such a hypothesis leads to inconsistency. Therefore, I estimated the average treatment 
effect employing both propensity scores and matching estimators: the evidence is unchanged. This 
is true also for a SUR estimator; moreover these system estimates show that there is no significant 
correlation between the residuals of the two index models and residuals of the pricing equation. 
This excludes the presence of unobservable determinants of both selection rules and prices.    28 
significant negative effect on electricity rates. I obtain similar evidence when the 
dependent variable is the mark up of prices on average costs. 
 
4.2.2 Panel Estimates  
However, as explained above, even if robust to several estimation procedures, 
persuasive cross-firms evidence has to be confirmed by the introduction of a time 
dimension. This is why, exploiting the variation in selection rules and costs within 
states,
30 I look at the effect of cost shocks on prices running panel pass-through 
models. Due to lack of data, the only available and reasonable measure of average 
costs is the fossil fuels component (i.e., , s t c - see also Besley and Coate [2003]). 
To test once again part 2. of the Empirical Predictions, I run the following model 
, , , 1 , , _ _ _ s t s t s t s t s t s t p Reg Elec Jud Elec Reg Elec c η β φ ς υ = + + + + +  
                                             2 , , 3 , , , _ s t s t s t s t s t Jud Elec c c Con υ υ ϕ ε + + + +                      (7) 
for each customers class. In (7)  , s t p  is a price for state s in year t;  s η  are state 
fixed effects controlling for long-run differences in production and distribution 
systems;  t β  are year dummies picking up macro-shocks and common changes in 
federal policy; , s t Con includes both state specific time varying controls (Gen_Fuel, 
Gen_Nucl,  Income,  Income
2,  Pop,  Pop
2)  and  proxies  for  the  efficiency  of  the 
supervision technology (Budget, Employ, Ind, Young, Over_65);  , _ s t Jud Elec and 
, _ s t Reg Elec  represent the time varying dummy for election rules. Basic figures 
                                                 
30 Being simultaneity a real concern here, unlike Besley and Coate [2003], the panel data set 
includes also the switching states. When switching states are excluded or the Besley and Coate 
[2003]’s sample (1960-1997) is used, all the results continue to hold true.   29 
are  given in Table 8. The coefficient on costs interacted with whether a state 
elects  its  public  officials  is  everywhere  negative,  but,  again,  only  the  elected 
judges’ one is significant (at 1%). This implies that prices in judges electing states 
are almost insensitive to shocks in the fossil fuels’ component of average costs. 
These  findings  strengthen  the  cross-firms  conclusions  and  provide  strong 
evidence on the critical relevance of the judges’ selection rule. Of course, as in 
Besley  and  Coate  [2003],  only  , _ s t Reg Elec   is  significant  when  , _ s t Jud Elec   is 
excluded. Selection rules enter also as direct effects: these coefficients, identified 
purely  off  the  time  variation  in  the  switching  states,  give  the  level  effects  of 
institutions. These are positive for both rules but significant only in the judges’ 
case  (see  (3))  and  always  for  , _ s t Reg Elec .  The  total  effect  of  , _ s t Jud Elec   is 
3 , ˆ ˆ s t c ς υ + = – 0.207 cents per Kwh for industrial rates. Residential and commercial 
users enjoy a similar reduction (6%). When significant, the proxies for efficient 
supervision  technologies  (except  Over_65)  show  a  negative  sign:  this  would 
partially reassure the reader about the mixed cross-firms’ results. This evidence is 
confirmed when conditional independence is relaxed and I use the Arellano-Bond 
estimator  with  two  lags  of  the  dependent  variable:  OLS  overestimate  the 
, _ s t Jud Elec  effect and the over-identifying restrictions are never rejected. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks  
Strong “revolving door” and “legacy” effect may make ineffective the regulators’ 
institutional design and, indeed, U.S. electric power market data suggest that only 
a reform from appointment to election of ALJs will significantly lower electricity 
rates. This finding becomes sharp when conditional independence is relaxed and   30 
cross  sectional-time  series  data  are  employed.
31  Moreover,  a  better  signal 
extraction technology lowers rates along with institutions that focus supervisors’ 
implicit incentives. An open question remains: who is paying for lower electricity 
prices?  The  welfare  comparisons  depend  upon  the  weights  that  are  placed  on 
short  run  (i.e.,  consumer  surplus)  vs.  long  run  (i.e.,  technological  efficiency) 
perspectives. If investments’ concerns are relevant, a possibly partisan planner 
will take both efficiency and rent seeking reasons into consideration: the index 
models’ results confirm this idea. On top of it, my analysis delivers three main 
points  to  be  seriously  considered  by  actual  constitutional  designers:  1.  the 
importance  of  a  careful  assessment  of  the  benefits  linked  to  independence-
enhancing institutions (namely appointment) for supervisors when expropriation 
of  investment  is  a  real  concern;  2.  the  relevance  of  a  deep  evaluation  of  the 
effective efficiency of the signal extraction technology (extent of participation of 
watchdog groups and regulatory agencies’ resources) when accountability rules 
are chosen; 3. the welfare gains related to a Constitutional table insulated from 
short-term electoral boosts when the regulatory design is decided.  
 
 
                                                 
31 An interesting further test can be performed looking at the reforms from appointment to election 
of ALJs. A nice case is South Dakota that switched in the middle of the sample (1981). When I 
run  a  threshold  model  with  controls  Income,  Pop,  Young,  Over_65,  Gen_Fuel,  Budget_S, 
Employ_S, such a reform shows a significant (at 1%) negative effect on prices (19% reduction). 
Due to the fewness of reforms, the analysis cannot be performed on a panel of switching states 
only. Another   robustness check consists in using the residential-industrial rate ratio (see Holburn 
and Spiller [2002]) as dependent variable in the pass through specification. Again I obtain that 
only 
, _ s t Jud Elec   has a small and significant marginal negative effect.   31 
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6. Appendix 
6.1 Implicitly Motivated Supervisors 
Maximizing  , , ( , ) i l i l R e S   with  respect  to  , i l e   given 
exp
, i l e ,  and  imposing  in  equilibrium 
exp
, , i l i l e e = , involves, in an interior solution, the following first order conditions:  
, ˆA R e :                      [3(1 – R)]/(2 , ˆA R e )     =                , ˆ ( ) A R C e ′ ￿ ;                                 
, ˆE R e :               [3(1 – R)fα(α )]/(2 , ˆE R e )   =               , ˆ ( ) E R C e ′ ￿ ;                                        
, ˆA J e :                                     3/(2 , ˆA J e )     =       (1– J) , ˆ ( ) A J C e ′ ￿ ;                                        
, ˆE J e  :                            3fα(α )/(2 , ˆE J e )     =       (1– J) , ˆ ( ) E J C e ′ ￿ .                                       
Given that fα(α )>1, the solution efforts are such that:  , , ˆ ˆ E J A J e e >  and  , , ˆ ˆ E R A R e e > .               ■                 35 
6.2 Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit 
The socially optimal ˆ I  minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs: 
[ ] 0 ˆ argmin (1 ( )) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( )) I I I v I v I I v I ζ θ ζ θ θ ζ θ ≥ ∈ + + + − + = + − + ∆            (8) 
This amounts to say that the objective in (8) assumes a value greater at I
* than at  ˆ I .  
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two 
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium: 
* * * , * *
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( )
S I
i R i J I v I v I e e q I I θ ζ θ ζ γ θ + − + ∆ + + − ∆ − ≥ 
, *
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ( )) (1 ( ))[1 ( , )] ( )
S I
i R i J I v I v I e e q I I θ ζ θ ζ γ θ + − + ∆ + + − ∆ −  
or  { }
* , *
, , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( ) ( )) 1 [1 ( , )] ( ) 0
S I
i R i J v I I e e q I ζ ζ θ γ − ∆ − − ≥ . Given the properties of  ( ) ζ ′ i  and the 
first order condition of (5), I have that 
* ˆ ( ) ( ) I I ζ ζ ≥  or
* ˆ I I ≤ . If, as it is likely, the cost 
of investment is lower in low cost markets and taking into consideration how K affects 
, , ˆ ˆ ( , ) i R i J e e γ , Proposition 3 immediately follows.                                                                 ■ 
 
6.3 Positive Determinants of Regulators’ Appointment Rule 
A planner of type j will prefer election if the following holds: 
( ) { [
, , ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , )
AI S AI S
P P j W E W A G A j I G E j I v A G A j ο λ χ γ − > ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ + + + − + ￿ ￿ ￿  
                                                          [ ( ) ( , ) ( )( ( , ) ( , )) ( )( ( , ) j E G E j x A G A j G A j E G A j γ γ γ − − + − − − +  
                                                          ] } ( , )) ( 1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) j G E j A I A j E I E j χ λ γ γ    − − + − − −   
￿ ￿                         (9) 
where – j represents the opposing party. At this point, note that  ( , ) ( , ) G i j I i j ≥  and that 
the following inequalities hold by hypotheses:  
( , ) ( , ); ( , ) ( , ); ( ) ( ); ( , ) ( , ); I A R I A D I E R I E D A E G A R G A D γ γ ≥ ≥ > ≥  
( , ) ( , ); ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) G E R G E D G A R G A D G E R G E D ≥ − ≥ − .                                         (10) 
As a consequence, (9) rewrites for an incumbent Republican as: 
[ ] {
, ,
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
AI S AI S
P P R W E W A G A D G E D x G A R G E R G A D G E D ο − > − + − − − +                         36 
                                                        [ { [ (2 ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ( ) ( ))( ( , ) R v d A G A D E G E D x A E G A R λ γ γ γ γ + + − + − +             
                                                    ] ( , )) ( )( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )) G A D E G A R G A D G E R G E D γ − + − − + +   
                                                   [ ]} (2 ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )) . R d I A D I E D x I A R I A D I E R I E D λ + − − + − − +  (11) 
Taking into consideration (10), the comparative statics with respect to { }
, , , j j D R d x J
=
  of 
the right hand side of (11) and of the symmetric expression for a type D planner lead to 




This  analysis  exploits  both  cross  sectional  and  time  variation  in  the  data.  The  cross 
sectional analysis’ sample consists of 144 firms belonging to 46 states and the District of 
Columbia  for  1996.  Nebraska  has  been  excluded  because  it  has  no  investor–owned 
utilities while Utah, Wyoming and Alaska because only minor (see below) utilities serve 
these states. Only data at the state level are available in the panel analysis that spans the 
period 1970-1997. Here, besides Nebraska, the District of Columbia has been excluded 
because no data points are available before 1987. This choice does not change any result. 
 
I. Cross Sectional Analysis: 
A.1 Data for electricity prices, operations and maintenance expenses, taxes, utility’s net 
electric plant (in thousands dollars) and sales (in Mwh) are directly collected from a 
Department of Energy (DOE) publication:  
DOE, [1996], Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor–Owned Electric Utilities, EIA 
Washington DC. 
This survey is processed and published by EIA (Energy Information Administration) for 
the FERC. Major investor-owned electric utilities are defined as those that, in the past 
three consecutive calendar years, meet one or more of the following criteria: 1.1 million   37 
Mwh of total annual sales; 2. 100 Mwh of annual sales for resale; 3. 500 Mwh of annual 
power exchanges delivered; 4. 500 Mwh of annual wheeling for others.  
The 1996 data are based on reports from 179 major IOUs. Only those 144 that sell energy 
to all and each of the three broader customer classes (i.e., residential, commercial and 
industrial)  have  been  included  (see  Guerriero  [2006,  b]  for  a  complete  breakdown).  
Average price is calculated as total revenue from sales to ultimate consumers divided by 
the corresponding quantity. Residential, commercial and industrial prices are calculated 
from the respective revenues and sales; O&M, D&A, Taxes and Plant represent average 
production costs and they are computed dividing the relevant expenses by total sales (i.e. 
the sum of sales to ultimate consumers plus sales for resale). In particular, operations and 
maintenance expenses are the sum of direct costs of power generation, transmission, and 
distribution and overhead costs (customer accounts and service and sales, administrative 
and general expenses). Taxes represents the sum of federal and state income taxes, other 
taxes, plus minor adjustments for net payments for deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit. These figures are expressed in cents per Kwh. 
A.2 The NASUCA website lists the states that present a state consumer advocate office. 
A.3 Data on education are from Geospatial and Statistical Data Center (GEOSTAT). 
A.4 Join is directly collected from Hanssen [2004 a]. 
 
II. Panel Analysis: 
B.1 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbooks: 
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992, Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry; 
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington D. C. 
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA, 
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and 
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and   38 
sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for 
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation 
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by 
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one. 
B.2 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of 
energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net 
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as:  pit  =  Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the 
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity 
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil). 
B.3 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets, number of commissioners and 
number of PUCs’ full time employees are collected from: 
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC. 
B.4 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks: 
CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY. 
B.5  Data  on  judges’  selection  rule  and  length  terms  are  collected  from  Hanssen,  F. 
Andrew [2004 b, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].  
B.6 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5-
17 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication: 
UCB, [1970-1997], Population Estimates Program, UCB, Washington DC.  
B.7 Data on dockets concerning the US electric power market are collected from: 
NARUC, [1974-1990], Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation of the National 
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 Preliminary Analysis 
 
  Table 1: Variables Names and Descriptions. 
  Var.  Description 





Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise. 
 
Dummy taking value 1 if judges are elected, 0 otherwise. 











Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by the 
majority (Av_Maj.1996  = average within the 1986-1996 period). 
 
Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats and 
Republicans (Av_Dist.1996  = average within the 1986-1996 period). 
 












Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are three, 0 otherwise. 
 
Consumer advocate’s dummy, taking value 1 if the state has a state 
consumer advocate office dealing with electricity dockets, 0 otherwise. 
 
PUC’s full time employees.  
 














Percentage of population aged 65 and over. 
 
Percentage of population aged 5-17. 
 
Percentage of revenue from industrial users. 
 
Number of dockets (electricity) opened in front of the PUC per firm. 
 
Duration of dockets (electricity) opened in front of the PUC per firm   
(%Docket > 5 = Percentage Enduring More than Five Months). 
Average Costs 















Operation and maintenance costs in cents per Kwh sales. 
 
Depreciation and amortization costs in cents per Kwh sales. 
 
Taxes payments in cents per Kwh sales. 
 
Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh sales) – see Appendix 6.2. 
 
Price of fossil fuels (composite) per net Kwh sales (cents per Kwh). 
 














Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources. 
 
Percentage of total generation from nuclear source. 
 
Year in which the state has joined the union. 
 
Per. of 1990 population aged 25 and over, who graduated high school. 
 
State income per capita in dollars. 
 
State Population in Thousands People. 




Table 2: Mean in Mean Differences. 
  States that 
Elect Judges 
State that 
Appoint Judges  All 
  1974 – 1990 


















N. of obs.  680  680  680 
  1970 – 1997 


















N. of observations  1372  1372  1372 
Notes:   1. Standard errors in parentheses;    
              2. Test for Equality of Means Between Series:  






Table 3: Supervisors’ Selection Rule, 1970–1996. 
Judges’ Selection Rule 
Jud_Elec   [21]: 
AL[P], AR[P], GA[P(1970-1983)/Np], ID[Np], IL[P], KY[Np],  
LA[P(1970-1975)/Np], MI[Np], MN[Np], MS[P(1970-1994)/Np], 
MT[Np], NV[Np], NC[P], ND[Np], OH[Np], OR[Np],  
PA[P], TX[P], WA[Np], WV[P], WI[Np];  
Jud_App    [21]: 
AK[Mp], CA[G],  CO[Mp], CT[G], DC[G], DE[G], HI[Mp], 
IN[Mp], IA[Mp], KS[Mp], ME[G], MA[G], MO[Mp], NH[G], 
NJ[G], OK[Mp], RI[Le(1970-1994)/G], SC[Le], UT[Mp], 
VT[Le(1970-1974)/G], VA[Le]; 
Jud_Switch  [8]: 
AZ[Np(1970-1974)/Mp], FL[P(1970-1972)/Np(1972-1976)/Mp] 
MD[Np(1970-1975)/Mp], NM[P(1970-1989)/Mp],  
NY[P(1970-1977)/G], SD[Np(1970-1981)/Mp],  
TN[P(1970-1994)/Mp], WY[Np(1970-1972)/Mp]. 
Commissioners’ Selection Rule 
Reg_Elec   [10]:  AL, AZ, GA, LA, MS, MT, ND, OK, SD, VA; 
Reg_App   [35]: 
 
AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME, 
MD, MA, MI, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, 
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Non Random Constitution Selection 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Selection Rule - Logit and RE Logit Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.:  Reg_Elec  Reg_Elec  Jud_Elec  Jud_Elec 
Av_Maj    40.948 
(24.609)*    41.514 
(11.128)*** 
Av_Maj*Rep    -68.553 
(24.673)***     
Rep    39.449 
(14.103)***     
Av_Dist    -5.500 
(11.539) 













(16.826)**    -2.358 










Young    -2.270 




















Doc_Dur      0.984 
(0.236)***   
P_Fuel 
-67.462 
(28.472)**       
cst    -4.376 
(2.053)**    -0.384 
(0.532) 
O&M      -0.634 
(0.222)***   
Plant 
1.847 
(0.911)**       
Jud_Term      -1.187 
(0.350)***   
Av_Maj.1996 
-925.476 
(425.049)**    -301.906 
(75.234)***   
Av_Dist.1996 
600.492 
(278.503)**    145.057 
(34.980)***   
Gen_Fuel 
-75.405 
(37.264)**       




Income    -0.0006 
(0.0003)**    -0.0008 
(0.0001)** 
Edu      -0.846 
(0.226)***   
Join 
0.237 
(0.125)*    0.028 










Estimation  Logit  RE Logit Panel  Logit  RE Logit Panel 
N. of Observations  144  1372  144  1372 
Pseudo R
2   0.90    0.57   
Log Likelihood    -76.218    -125.530 
Chi_2  9.08**    21.06***   
Notes:   1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;    
               2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
               3. Chi_2 refers to the joint significance test on excluded instruments.   42 
Cross–sectional and Panel Inference 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Prices - OLS Estimates. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Prices - Instrumental Variables Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkha  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 
















Ov-Id Test (P-Value)  0.70  0.47  0.94  0.85 
Endogenous Var.:  J_Elec  J_Elec   J_Elec   J_Elec 
Other Controls  Constant, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Over_65, 
Ind, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel , Join. 
Estimation  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
N. of Observations                   144  144  144  144 
Adjusted R
2  0.87  0.82  0.82  0.84 
Notes:    1.  Standard errors in parentheses; 
               2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; 
               3. First-stage specification of 2SLS includes second step right hand side controls plus: 
                   Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkha  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 
























































































D&M Test: Reg_Elec  0.71  0.58  0.77  0.52 
D&M Test: Jud_Elec  0.02  0.24  0.57  0.01 
Other Controls   Constant, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel. 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
N. of Observations  144  144  144  144 
Adjusted R
2  0.89  0.83  0.82  0.88 
Notes:  1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
            2.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; 
            3.  The specification for the first step of the D&M test on the regulators’ selection rule is:  
                 Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, P_Fuel, Pop, Over_65, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate,  
                 Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Ind,Join, Jud_Elec, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel; 
            4.  The specification for the first step of the D&M test on the judges’ selection rule is:  
                 Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu, Over_65, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate, 
                 Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Ind, Join, Reg_Elec, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel.   43 
 
Table 7: Determinants of Prices - LIML and Heckman Estimates. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkha  Rkhi  Rkha  Rkhi 
















Rho      0.85***  0.86*** 
Endogenous Var.:  Jud_Elec  Jud_Elec   Jud_Elec   Jud_Elec 
Other Controls  Constant, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Over_65,
Ind, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel, Join. 
Estimation  LIML  LIML  Heck. ML  Heck. ML 
N. of Observations                  144  144  144  144 
Adjusted R
2  0.87  0.83     
Log Likelihood      -196.034  -190.904 
Notes:   1.  Standard errors in parentheses; 
              2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%;  
              3. First-stage specification of LIML includes first step right hand side controls plus: 
                  Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu. 
              4. First-stage specification of Heckman includes:  
                 Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu, Over_65, Ind, Jud_Term,  
                 Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, O&M, Join. 
 
 
Table 8: Results on Pass-through - Introduction of Jud_Elec. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Var.:  Rkhr  Rkhc  Rkhi 




































































Other  Controls  Gen_Fuelst , Gen_Nuclst ,  Popst , (Popst)
2 , Incomest , (Incomest)
2 .  
Estimation  Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator. 
N. of Obs.  1372  1372  1372 
R
2  0.88  0.85  0.83 
Notes:   1. Standard errors in parentheses;      
              2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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